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An Inspection of Rail Franchise Procurement: First-
Class Regulation for Privatised Passenger Rail? 
Luke R. A. Butler1 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Since privatisation, successive Governments have employed franchising to deliver 
passenger rail in Great Britain. There are now weekly media reports of franchise 
failures. However, despite being a subject of considerable public interest, there has 
been limited legal debate.2 The potential field of enquiry is massive given the complex 
network of legally responsible actors which include, among others, the DfT which 
procures services from the market, Network Rail which provides the infrastructure, the 
Office of Rail and Road (ORR) as regulator, and Train Operating Companies (TOCs).3 
The modest aim of this article is to explore just one regulatory aspect, procurement. 
Regulation has two senses in this context which can overlap and cause conflict. The 
first concerns the law and policy applicable to how contracts are advertised, bidders 
selected, and bids evaluated and challenged in pursuit of certain objectives, e.g. non-
discrimination, equal treatment (and transparency) to achieve an EU internal market 
and/or to obtain value for money for the UK taxpayer. The second, which is often 
overlooked, concerns how procurement is used as a regulatory tool to achieve other 
objectives which support economic management, e.g. improving public participation in 
the provision of rail through stakeholder consultation and increasing accountability 
and transparency in the design and delivery of a vital public service.4 
Rail experts may rightly point out that a focus on procurement neglects other 
more systemic and pressing issues such as poor contract management. However, 
                                                 
1
 Birmingham Law School. The author is grateful to the Birmingham Law School Peer Review Panel (in 
particular, Catherine Mitchell), Tony Prosser (University of Bristol), Mark Wilde (University of Reading), 
Richard Craven (University of Leicester) and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts.  
2 It is difficult to pinpoint the reasons why. It may be due to the fact that this is a politically sensitive field 
in which the Government exercises commercial discretion. Further, the rail industry operates in a market 
comprising high risk. There may be a concern that legal regulation is seen as potentially inflexible, 
inhibiting or fettering discretion and imposing regulatory burdens on industry in what purports to be a 
deregulated market. In addition, there is a perception that certain aspects of rail are already heavily 
regulated e.g. it has its own regulator in the form of the Office of Rail and Road. 
3
 Legal issues could include inter alia: the legal design, management and enforcement of franchise 
agreements; the respective regulatory functions of Network Rail and the Office of Rail and Road; merger 
control of TOCs, including the role of the Competition and Markets Authority; and procurement by 
Network Rail and TOCs, which has resulted in several reported cases. 
4
 See generally, T. Prosser, The Economic Constitution (OUP Oxford 2014) Ch.9 and citations therein. 
Legislation governing the process for awarding contracts is also increasingly designed to achieve 
objectives other than buying services e.g. ensuring regulatory compliance with social and other 
standards. See P. Telles and G. S. Olykke, “Sustainable Procurement: A Compliance Perspective of EU 
Public Procurement Law” (2017) 3 E.P.P.P.L.R. 239.  
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poor procurement is a prelude to poor management. Further, inquiries have 
specifically identified a need for significant improvement in procurement. This focus 
also fills important gaps in the literature. First, it provides a first critical evaluation of 
the extent to which the DfT has responded to recent recommendations for reform in 
light of recent inquiries. Second, it provides a useful case study for future comparative 
analysis. The UK’s model of competitive tendering for rail services has been identified 
as one to emulate across the EU. Of course, such analysis has a new significance as 
Brexit will necessitate international agreements on reciprocal access to EU and global 
markets for the procurement of rail services. Third, it contributes to the perennial 
debate on the role of the public sector in privatised rail, given the prohibition on public 
sector bidding. Finally, it provides a vehicle for introducing wider themes into legal 
debate, namely the impact of post-privatisation challenges facing rail regulation. 
This article argues as follows. First, domestic law and policy is generally 
compatible with EU law, the main body of procurement law in this field. Nevertheless, 
domestic law and policy reveals legal uncertainty. This renders the permissible 
exercise of franchising powers unclear, creates a risk of legal challenge and limits the 
possibility for effective judicial review. It has also resulted in commercial uncertainty 
for TOCs that require predictability in procurement cycles for the franchising 
programme. An analysis of UK implementation of EU law also confirms that this 
uncertainty is, in part, a result of general uncertainty in EU law and policy that must be 
resolved. Second, it is argued that the DfT has taken some action in response to 
recent franchise failures but there remain potential areas for reform. Third, the DfT 
should think more strategically not just in terms of how the procurement process is 
regulated but also how procurement is used to respond to post-privatisation 
challenges. These include: increasing supra-national influences on rail, an evolving 
model of rail service provision including devolution, and growing expectations for 
greater public scrutiny of all forms of public contracting.  
 
2. Context  
 
2.1. Rail Franchising  
 
Franchising comprises the following key aspects. 5  The Secretary of State (SoS), 
                                                 
5
 On franchising as a regulatory strategy generally, see R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, 
Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (2
nd
 ed Oxford University Press, Oxford), Ch.9. 
For an introduction to debate on rail franchising as a regulatory model, see T. Prosser and L. Butler, “Rail 
Franchises, Competition and Public Service” (2018) 81(1) Modern Law Review, 23. For a useful overview 
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acting through the DfT, grants exclusive rights to a private sector TOC to provide 
services. In return, the TOC has a right to charge fares typically, but not always, 
retaining revenue.6 However, many franchises also require the payment of substantial 
premia to the DfT. 7 The DfT may also pay subsidies in respect of socially necessary 
services which are otherwise commercially unprofitable. As will be discussed in 
Sections 3 and 4, to select a TOC, the DfT generally conducts a competitive 
procurement process through an invitation to tender (ITT). In conducting this process, 
the SoS and TOCs enter into a franchise process letting agreement to enable 
cooperation, prevent collusion and ensure controls on publication, access to, and 
disclosure of, confidential information during the procurement process. A franchise 
agreement is then concluded with the winning TOC. The franchise agreement 
includes details of performance standards, penalties and termination in the event of 
failure. TOCs must also obtain licences from the DfT and the ORR to operate and pay 
track access charges to Network Rail. At the time of writing, there were sixteen 
franchises in England and Wales and two in Scotland.8 
 There have been several recent high-profile franchise failures. In 2012, the 
InterCity West Coast (ICWC) competition was cancelled. As will be discussed in 
Section 4.4.2, this was principally due to lack of transparency of information provided 
to bidders with respect to capital requirements, lack of equal treatment in the 
application of evaluation criteria, and erroneous exercises of discretion. This 
precipitated the temporary suspension of the franchising programme, two inquiries 
and a number of interim direct awards to incumbents pending new competitions. The 
Laidlaw inquiry into the ICWC competition found significant errors in the procurement 
process and the Brown Review examined franchising more generally.9 Brown devoted 
an entire Chapter to procurement finding that, although the bidding process is not 
fundamentally flawed, there was “significant scope to improve it further”. 10  This 
included a number of recommendations, certain of which are explored in this article. 
There have also been regular Transport Committee, Public Accounts Committee and 
                                                                                                                                             
of the main features of rail franchising, see L. Butcher, Passenger rail services in England, House of 
Commons Library Briefing Paper, Number CBP 6521, 9 January 2018. 
6
 The Thameslink, Southern and Great Northern (TSGN) franchise has been described as a 
“management contract”. The TOC receives a fixed payment for delivering services but gives all fares 
revenue to the DfT. 
7
 In 2015/16, TOCs made a net contribution of £877 million to the Government compared to £400 million 
paid in 2011/12. See Office of Rail and Road, 2015-16 Annual Rail Finance Statistics, 12 October 2016. 
8
 For a useful overview of individual franchises, see L. Butcher, Railway passenger services, House of 
Commons Library Briefing Paper, Number CBP 1343, 18 January 2018.  
9
 Report of the Laidlaw Inquiry into the lessons learned for the Department for Transport from the 
InterCity West Coast Competition, 6 December 2012; Department for Transport, Response to the Report 
of the Laidlaw Inquiry, 6 December 2012; The Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme, 
January 2013, Cm8526; and Government Response to the Brown Review of the Rail Franchising 
Programme, July 2013, Cm8678.   
10
  Brown Review, p.8, para.1.11.  
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National Audit Office inquiries.11  
 
2.2. Legal framework 
 
The Railways Act 1993 (1993 Act) provides the legal foundation for privatisation. It 
regulates inter alia franchising, licences for operation, track access agreements, and 
enforcement. The 1993 Act has subsequently been amended in parts but the sub-part 
on franchising remains substantially unchanged. Regarding franchising specifically, a 
first aspect concerns scope of coverage, prescribing: the SoS’ powers for determining 
which services are subject to franchise agreements; services which are exempt; and 
the prohibition on bidding by public sector operators.12 A second aspect concerns 
tendering, prescribing matters to be taken into account when issuing a tender and the 
circumstances in which no adequate tenders are received.13 A third aspect concerns 
financial and administrative matters such as: the transfer of franchise assets and 
shares to the TOC; fares; other terms and conditions in the franchise agreement; and 
leases.14 A final aspect concerns the SoS’ duty to provide services where a franchise 
is terminated or ends.15  Ancillary provisions in other sub-parts include orders for 
compliance and penalties for contravention of the terms of a franchise agreement.16    
Whilst, as indicated, the 1993 Act contains provisions on tendering, it does not 
provide detailed procedural rules for award comparable to those under the EU 
procurement Directives.17 Until recently, it was unclear to what extent rail services 
contracts, and, thus, rail franchises, must be procured in accordance with the 
Directives. It was possible to argue that franchises constituted Part B “non-priority” 
services under the 2004 Public Contracts Directive. These were not subject to the 
Directive’s full application but certain provisions did apply, including technical 
                                                 
11
 National Audit Office, Lessons from cancelling the InterCity West Coast franchise competition, Report 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 796, Session 2012-12, 7 December 2012; House of 
Commons Transport Committee, Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast competition: Government 
update on the Laidlaw and Brown reports, Fifteenth Special Report of Session 2013–14, 10 February 
2014; House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Reform of the rail franchising programme, 
Twenty-first Report of Session 2015–16, 3 February 2016; Rail franchising, Ninth Report of Session 
2016-17, 30 January 2017; Rail franchising in the UK, Twenty-Fifth Report of Session 2017-19, 27 April 
2018. At the time of writing, there is an ongoing inquiry into the Inter City East Coast franchise. 
12
 S.23; S.24; S.24A; and S.25. 
13
 S.26 and S.26ZA. 
14
 S.27; S.28; S.29; and S.31. 
15
 S.30. 
16
 §55-58.  
17 See The Public Contracts Regulations 2015, S.I. 2015, No.102 implementing Directive 2014/24/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing 
Directive 2004/18/EC OJ L 94/65; and The Utilities Contracts Regulations, S.I. 2016, No.274 
implementing Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and 
repealing Directive 2004/17/EC OJ L 94/243.  
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specifications, contract award notices and applications to a court for remedies. 
Alternatively, such contracts could be classified as “concessions” which were 
excluded from the Directive.18 Historically, concessions were excluded for a number of 
reasons. One reason was that, in the legal systems of some Member States, 
concessions were not regarded as “ordinary procurement” but as a different kind of 
legal relationship necessitating alternative arrangements. 19  In any event, the DfT 
always applied EU Treaty principles (e.g. non-discrimination, equal treatment and 
transparency) on the assumption that franchises are contracts of cross-border 
interest. 20  The Directives were recently reformed. Further, a new Concessions 
Directive was adopted filling an “important lacuna” in the Directives’ coverage.21 Some 
anticipated that the Concessions Directive would bring rail services within its scope.22 
However, all Directives now expressly confirm their exclusion.23  
Rail contracts have been excluded because they now fall principally within the 
scope of other targeted EU secondary legislation, namely the Regulation on public 
service obligations for public passenger transport services by rail and road (PSO 
Regulation) adopted in 2007. 24  DfT policy and practice confirms this position 
domestically.25At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the PSO Regulation’s 
impact has been very limited but nevertheless requires discussion given its relatively 
                                                 
18  The then Public Contract Services Regulations 1993 S.I. 1993 No. 3228 (implementing Council 
Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
service contracts OJ L 209/1) provided that a “public services contract” did not include a contract under 
which “consideration includes the right to exploit the provision of services” i.e. a services concession (reg. 
2 PCSR). For a discussion of the legal position at that time, see
 
S. P. Norris, “The proposed extension of 
rail franchises – an E.C. procurement law perspective” (1999) 5 P.P.L.R. 151. Council Directive of 31 
March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts OJ L 134/114 confirmed an express exclusion (Article 1(4) and 
reg. 2(1) as implemented in The Public Contracts Regulations 2006 S.I. 2006 No.5 (reg.6(2)(m)). 
19
 S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utiltiies Procurement, Regulation in the EU and UK: Volume I 
(3
rd
 ed. Sweet & Maxwell London 2014), para. 6-58. 
20
 HL Deb 01 July 2004 vol 663 c48WA: Railways: Franchises, Question by Lord Berkley [HL3379]; 
response by Lord Davies of Oldham.   
21
 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
award of concession contracts OJ L 94/1 (as implemented in The Concession Contracts Regulations 
2016, S.I. 2016, No.273). See Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utiltiies Procurement, para.6-59. 
22
 R Boyle, “The ‘Fiasco’ of the West Coast Rail Franchise and the European Public Procurement Rules” 
(2013) 6(22) International In-house Counsel Journal, 9. 
23 Recital 27 and Article 10(i) Directive 2014/24/EU (as implemented in reg.10(1)(i) PCR 2015); Recital 
21 and Article 10(3) Directive 2014/23/EU (as implemented in reg.10(4)(b) CCR 2016); and Recitals 20 
and 35 and Article 21(g) Directive 2014/25/EU (as implemented in reg.21(1)(g) UCR 2016). 
24 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) Nos 
1191/69 and 1107/70 OJ L 315. For general commentary, see G. S. Olykke, “Legislative Comment: 
Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services” (2008) 3 P.P.L.R. 84; and D. van de 
Velde, “A new regulation for the European public transport” (2008) 22 Research in Transportation 
Economics 78.  
25
 See Department for Transport, Passenger Services Franchise Competition Guide, January 2016. 
Recent franchise contract notices have expressly stated that the DfT does not undertake to carry out the 
tender process in line with the Directives for contracts covered by the PSO Regulation. See the contract 
notice for the East Anglia franchise: http://ted.europa.eu/TED/notice/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:65248-
2015:TEXT:EN:HTML (last accessed 20 April 2018). 
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new significance in the field. The PSO Regulation is part of the EU’s “Railway 
Package”, a set of instruments intended to progressively open up rail transport service 
markets to competition, increase interoperability of national railways systems, and 
develop a single European railway area.26 The PSO Regulation’s purpose is to define 
how authorities may guarantee provision of transport services of general interest (i.e. 
those subject to specific public service obligations) by laying down conditions under 
which they will compensate operators for costs incurred and grant exclusive rights in 
return for their discharge.27 In 2016, the Regulation was amended.28 
Fundamentally, it has been argued that there is a tension underlying the PSO 
Regulation that is difficult to resolve and no attempt to do so will be made in this 
article. 29  This concerns the attempt to introduce competitive tendering to enable 
monopolies to provide public services whilst continuing to preserve the integrity of 
those services. In the absence of a “communitised” definition and minimum content of 
services of general economic interest and public service obligations, it is difficult to 
attain any degree of meaningful harmonisation across Member States. 30  This has 
resulted in fairly general rules which retain considerable freedom of action for Member 
States. Further, in part, because of the close relationship between the state and 
operators in certain Member States, the PSO Regulation’s primary focus is on 
preventing over-compensation to prevent unlawful State aid, rather than opening 
markets to competition.31 This has particular implications for rules on contract award. 
Regarding coverage, the PSO Regulation applies to the award of a “public 
service contract” meeting “public service obligations”.32 However, it is questionable 
whether all franchises actually satisfy these definitions. The orthodox understanding 
of a public service obligation is the undertaking of socially desirable but otherwise 
commercially unprofitable services in return for the grant of a subsidy. As indicated in 
Section 2.1, many franchises provide record premiums to Government. Regarding the 
nature of procurement rules, the PSO Regulation states that the rationale for rules on 
                                                 
26
Details of the fourth Railway Package can be found at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/packages/2013_en (last accessed 20 April 2018).  
27
 Article 1(1). 
28 Regulation (EU) 2016/2338 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger 
transport services by rail (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 345/22. 
29
 See generally, C. Maczkovics, “The Railways at the Crossroads of Liberalisation and Public Service” 
(2009) 4 E.P.P.P.L.R. 26. 
30
 Maczkovics, “The Railways at the Crossroads of Liberalisation and Public Service”, 36. 
31
 See generally, Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747. For the corresponding provisions see 
Recital 6 and Article 1.  
32
 Article 2(e) broadly defines “public service obligation” under a “public service contract” as: “a 
requirement defined or determined by a competent authority in order to ensure public passenger services 
in the general interest that an operator, if it were considering its own commercial interests would not 
assume or would not assume to the same extent or under the same conditions without reward.” 
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award is to address both disparities in procedures and the need for “common rules on 
award”.33 However, as indicated above, absent a consensus on a common definition 
and organisation of such services, the rules at best set minimum requirements as 
opposed to a framework for harmonisation. Far from constituting a “framework for 
public procurement” 34 in terms of detailed rules governing advertising, selection of the 
bidder, evaluation of the bid and review and remedies, its provisions have been 
described as “skeletal” when compared to the detailed rules under the procurement 
Directives.35 For instance, as will be discussed in Section 3, the PSO Regulation 
requires competitive tendering but the amended PSO Regulation has considerably 
expanded the circumstances permitting direct awards and whose sheer number risks 
displacing competitive tendering as a general rule.36 Further, to counter-balance this, 
it has introduced rules aimed at improving transparency regarding publication of 
contracts and reasons for decisions but there are no other detailed provisions.  
Finally, as will be discussed throughout this article, it is now unclear to what 
extent it is possible to draw on the procurement Directives analogously as well as 
existing EU Treaty principles in applying the PSO Regulation. 37 For instance, the 
PSO Regulation states that review and remedies should be comparable, “where 
appropriate”, to provisions under the procurement Remedies Directive.38 It has been 
criticised that Member States appear to provide general judicial or administrative 
review mechanisms as if rail contracts are awarded outside the Directives and that 
this mechanism does not present the same advantages as the Remedies Directive.39 
Domestic law and policy do not refer to review and remedies in detail. A franchise 
competition high-level process map simply refers to the possibility to “arbitrate on and 
resolve any disputes that arise.”40 However, domestic law appears to impose few 
constraints on stakeholders’ ability to obtain standing for judicial review.41 Further, as 
                                                 
33
 Recital 6 and Recital 24 amended PSO Regulation. 
34
 Olykke, “Legislative Comment: Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services”, 87. 
35
 Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utiltiies Procurement, para. 6-70. 
36
 Article 5(3); 5(3a); 5(3b); 5(4); 5(4a); 5(4b); and 5(5).  
37
 In Case C‑292/15 Hörmann Reisen GmbH v Stadt Augsburg, Landkreis Augsburg 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:817, paras.12, and 45-47, the Court referred to the PSO Regulation provisions on 
award of contracts in terms that such rules “derogate from EU public procurement law” but are also “lex 
specialis” taking precedence over the Public Contracts Directive which is of general application. 
38
 Recital 21; Article 5(7) and Recital 27 amended PSO Regulation. See generally Council Directive 
89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works 
contracts OJ L 395/33. 
39
 DLA Piper, Study on the implementation of Regulation (EC) N° 1370/2007 on public passenger 
transport services by rail and by road, Final Report, 31 October 2010, p.38. 
40
 Department for Transport, Franchise Competition High Level Process Map, 24 April 2013.  
41
 It has been observed judicially that any ideological objection to privatisation is not a bar to standing for 
a claim that a project should have been tendered. In R (on the application of: (1) National Union of Rail, 
Maritime and Transport Workers; (2) Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association; and (3) Associated Society 
of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 3030 (Admin), 
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will be discussed in Section 4.4.2, violation of EU Treaty principles provides sufficient 
legal grounds for challenging the procedural conduct of the award process. An issue 
open to debate concerns whether there are other sufficient grounds under domestic 
law on which to challenge wider aspects of the procurement process, e.g. concerning 
public consultation. In addition to permitting judicial review and the application of EU 
Treaty principles, domestic policy also provides for certain review and remedies 
available under the procurement Directives. For example, the DfT issues letters to 
unsuccessful bidders notifying intention of award, conveying key information 
regarding scoring of all bids and offering an opportunity to attend a feedback 
meeting.42 The DfT also provides a standstill period, preventing conclusion of the 
contract during that period, enabling economic operators to assess any basis for 
challenge. However, other remedies available under the Remedies Directive such as 
automatic suspension,43 ineffectiveness44 and an express claim for damages45 are not 
provided. 
In light of the above, unsurprisingly, the PSO Regulation has been “poorly 
implemented”. 46 As a directly applicable instrument that is highly generic, Member 
States have little incentive to take further implementing measures domestically and 
the EU Commission has limited scope for enforcement action.  
 
3. Competitive tendering and direct awards 
 
A first major decision concerning franchising is whether to open the procurement 
process to competition or make a non-competitive direct award. 
3.1. Competitive tendering 
                                                                                                                                             
Cranston J at para.22 was persuaded that the unions were arguably within the class of persons with a 
genuine interest and expertise in ensuring the SoS’s compliance with the PSO Regulation. For useful 
commentary in this context, see S. H. Bailey, “Reflections on standing for judicial review in procurement 
cases” (2015) 4 P.P.L.R. 122.   
42
 Department for Transport, Passenger Services: Franchise Competition Guide, 4 February 2016, 
para.4.39. The PSO Regulation also provides that, for certain direct awards, it is possible to request an 
assessment of the decision which must be made publicly available: Article 5(7)(h) amended PSO 
Regulation. In addition, if requested, reasons must be given: Article 7(4). Domestically, the direct award 
process guide is silent on the giving of reasons; however, its stated commitment to EU Treaty principles 
should require it. 
43
 As a matter of domestic law, it is possible to apply for interim relief to obtain an injunction to suspend 
the procurement, which principles broadly align with those concerning interim relief under the Directives. 
44
 Ineffectiveness is unlikely to be significant in practice as it requires breaches which include breach of 
the standstill period which, as indicated, is routinely observed in the UK. 
45
 The ability to suspend and rewind a procurement process before a contract is concluded is likely to be 
a far more valuable remedy than damages. 
46
 Steer Davies Gleave, Study on economic and financial effects of the implementation of Regulation 
1370/2007 on public passenger transport services, Final Report, February 2016, p.15: “it was not 
possible to identify a single contract or piece of legislation as the best practice […]”. See also DLA Piper, 
Study on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No.1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by 
rail and road, Final report (October 2010). 
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The DfT is generally committed to competitive tendering. The 1993 Act prescribes a 
franchising power by which the SoS may select a franchisee from those submitting 
tenders in response to an ITT.47 The SoS must publish a statement of policy in this 
regard.48 In 2008, the DfT published a statement which was subsequently revised in 
2013 in response to the Brown Review.49 However, it simply states that the SoS 
intends to select a franchisee by issuing an ITT except where a direct award is made 
or where no adequate tenders are received.50 These provisions now seem largely 
redundant given that the PSO Regulation formally requires competitive tendering.51  
Regarding numbers invited to bid, neither the 1993 Act, policy statement, nor 
the PSO Regulation specify a minimum number. The DfT has stated that it prefers to 
have three bidders but is prepared to accept that, on occasion, there may only be two 
genuine bidders.52  This is broadly compatible with the Public Contracts Directive 
which requires a minimum of three bidders.53 It is also to be expected in a market 
involving concentrated share ownership of TOCs, high entry costs and inherent risk 
involved in such contracts. The European Commission has identified the UK as 
attracting a relatively high number of bidders.54  
Regarding the choice of tendering procedure, again, neither the 1993 Act, 
policy statement nor PSO Regulation prescribe open, restricted or negotiated forms 
comparable to those under the Directives. The PSO Regulation simply provides that 
whatever procedure is adopted must be open to all operators, fair, and observe the 
principles of transparency and non-discrimination; further, the procedure may involve 
negotiations in order to determine how best to meet specific or complex requirements. 
55 The initial proposal for a Regulation provided for a procedure according to which 
the operator would be selected on the basis of a comparison of the quality of the 
                                                 
47
 S.26(1). 
48
 S.26(4A).  
49
 Department for Transport, Statement of policy on the exercise of the Secretary of State’s power under 
section 26(1) of the Railways Act 1993, March 2013. 
50
 Statement, 4, para.7, stating further that selection will be in accordance with the SoS’ obligations under 
EU Treaty principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.  
51
 Article 5(3).  
52
 Railways Procurement: Written Parliamentary question 126116 asked by Jonathan Edwards 
(Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) asked on 1 February 2018; Answered by Rail Minister Joseph Johnson 
on 12 February 2018. 
53
 Article 65. 
54
 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the documents Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 
concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail, Brussels, 
30.1.2013 SWD(2013) 10 final, 30, fn53. 
55
 Recital 22 and Article 5(3). 
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proposal; however, this was not included in the final text.56  
 
3.2. Direct awards  
 
Whilst the assumption should be that direct awards are the exception to the general 
rule of competitive tendering, circumstances in England have been complicated by the 
suspension of the franchising programme mentioned in Section 2.1. Brown expressly 
recommended interim extensions to existing contracts (which would otherwise require 
a new competitive award) to stabilise the programme pending resumption of a revised 
schedule.57 This included a recommendation to revise the policy statement to identify 
the circumstances in which the SoS will consider making direct awards, having regard 
to the applicable EU and domestic law framework.58 However, for reasons that will be 
explained, there has since been a profusion of direct awards both for strategic 
reasons and because of the practical reality that there are only a limited number of 
TOCs capable of, and interested in, running particular routes. By 2014, seven out of 
sixteen franchises were direct awards, anticipating a further six up to 2020. Further, 
the policy statement has not been revised since 2013 in light of this experience. This 
raises questions as to whether there is currently effective regulation of direct awards. 
It is argued that this is not the case. 
 Firstly, as indicated in Section 2.2, the PSO Regulation as amended has 
added several new direct award grounds which are so broad as to question 
competitive tendering as a policy preference. The EU’s purported rationale for these, 
namely, to respect differences in the way Member States organise their territory for 
rail, has been described as terse and in need of clearer explanation.59 However, some 
Member States have indicated that competition is incompatible with vertically 
integrated models of rail provision whereby the infrastructure manager and TOCs are 
owned by a single holding company and competitive tendering may be difficult to 
sustain.60  Indeed, this is the position in Member States such as Germany, France 
and Italy. It is therefore difficult to reconcile the EU’s claims that direct awards in this 
context are “derogations” or “exceptions” under EU law with the perception in practice. 
As will be discussed, even Great Britain, which favours competitive tendering, views 
                                                 
56
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on action by Member States 
concerning public service requirements and the award of public service contracts in passenger transport 
by rail, road and inland waterway (2000/C 365 E/10) C 365 E/169, Article 8. 
57
 Brown Review, p.60, para.8.5. 
58
 ibid., paras.8.4 and 8.5. 
59
 Recital 26 and Maczkovics, “The Railways at the Crossroads of Liberalisation and Public Service”, 34. 
60
 Letter from Baroness Kramer (Minister of State for Transport) to Lord Boswell (Chairman of the 
European Union Committee) 18 March 2015 and Letter from Rail Minister Claire Perry to Lord Boswell, 2 
October 2015. 
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direct awards as legitimate alternative means of ensuring the long-term stability of a 
competitive franchising programme. It is therefore unsurprising that the PSO 
Regulation’s compromise is to focus on improving publication of, and justification for, 
direct awards instead of restricting their scope, acknowledging that direct awards 
have lacked transparency.61  
 Secondly, there is very limited domestic law and policy on direct awards. The 
1993 Act does not contain designated direct award provisions. It simply provides that 
the policy statement must state when it is likely that an ITT will not be issued.62 In 
response to the DfT’s consultation on the proposed revised 2013 policy statement 
following Brown’s recommendation, TOCs also expressed concern that: 
 
[I]n a sector in which political principles are also very often the reason for 
suspending or altering franchise programmes, we are very nervous  about 
the implications of such an open and overarching definition for the 
exercise of powers.63  
 
The SoS was “strongly encourage[d]” to make it clear “beyond reasonable doubt” the 
circumstances when a direct award will be made. 64  The DfT did not make such 
clarifications in the final policy statement and it has not been revised since the 
amended PSO Regulation was adopted. 
 The policy statement only identifies two circumstances permitting direct 
awards.65 The first is where, in the SoS’s reasonable opinion, issuing an ITT would 
not be conducive to: (a) the effective administration of a sustainable and well-
resourced programme of franchising competitions; or (b) the fulfillment of government 
objectives in relation to rail transport (including as to the remapping of franchises).66 
Such awards derive a justification from the Brown Review which observed a need to 
avoid all franchises being awarded at the same point in an economic cycle to ensure 
that not all are subject to the same risk and for a more efficient use of DfT and bidder 
resources.67 However, aside from the fact that (a) and (b) are easily conflated, TOCs 
have criticized its open-endedness, anticipating flexibility without prescribing any 
                                                 
61
 Recital 30. 
62
 S.26(4B). 
63
 Greater Anglia and Northern Rail consultation responses to the draft policy Statement, 28 February 
2013, para.18. The authors are grateful to the DfT for providing the consultation responses pursuant to a 
Freedom of Information Act request (responses retained on file). 
64
 ibid., para.5. 
65
 According to the statement, awards will only be made where the SoS considers it is permitted under 
the applicable domestic and European law frameworks: p.5, para.9. 
66
 Statement, para.11. Controversially, Arriva Cross Country secured a three-year direct award to 
continue operating the Cross Country franchise until 2019 on this basis. 
67
 Brown Review, p.21, para.3.4.  
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“boundary conditions” for use.68 Similarly, the amended PSO Regulation has added a 
circumstance permitting a direct award where there are a number of competitive 
tendering procedures being run which could affect the number and quality of bids 
likely to be received if the contract is subject to a competitive tendering procedure.69 
Again, it is difficult to determine how the possible effect on the number and quality of 
bids can be shown. During negotiations of the amended PSO Regulation, the UK 
expressed concerns about broad direct award grounds generally but favoured a direct 
award in this circumstance.70 
The policy statement also provides that a direct award will be made where, in 
the SoS’s reasonable opinion, the disruption, or an immediate risk of disruption, of 
services means it is not practicable to issue an ITT.71 Again, TOCs and passenger 
groups have criticised the lack of certainty of meaning and the addition of “reasonable 
opinion” as generic and subjective.72 The PSO Regulation provides for a direct award 
as an “emergency measure” in the same circumstances but omitting reference to 
reasonable opinion or practicability.73 In 2014, the rail unions brought a judicial review 
against a direct award for the Thameslink Southern Great Northern (TSGN) franchise 
under the PSO Regulation emergency ground.74 The application was denied for being 
out of time but it was argued that a competitive procedure should have been followed, 
on the basis that there was no emergency because this ground should be interpreted 
as strictly analogous to circumstances permitting direct awards under the Public 
Contracts Directive.75 As discussed in Section 2.2, it is debatable whether the PSO 
Regulation grounds should be treated as analogous to the “derogations” under the 
Public Contracts Directive. A more nuanced argument is required than simply to plead 
the need for consistency across all areas of procurement covered by EU law where 
this is not necessarily merited. The lack of domestic law and policy (necessitating 
                                                 
68
 Greater Anglia and Northern Rail consultation response, 28 February 2013, para.17. 
69
 Recital 21 and Article 5(3a) amended PSO Regulation.  
70
 See Explanatory Memorandum on European Union Legislation (rail package), submitted by the 
Department for Transport, 14 February 2013, p.15. See also letter from Baroness Kramer to William 
Cash, 18 March 2015; Letter from Claire Perry to Lord Boswell, 20 Nov 2015; and Letter from Claire 
Perry to Lord Boswell, 2 May 2016. 
71
 Statement, para.10. 
72 Northern Rail consultation response to the draft policy Statement, para.5 and Transport for London 
consultation response, para.3. 
73
 Article 5(5). The period for which a public service contract is awarded, extended or imposed by 
emergency measures must not exceed two years. This presumes that, at the end of the period, there will 
be a new award: Recital 24. The InterCity West Coast mainline franchise was awarded on this basis. 
74
 R (on the application of: (1) National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers; (2) Transport 
Salaried Staffs’ Association; and (3) Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen v 
Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 3030 (Admin).   
75
 These include: Article 31(1)(b) and (c) concerning technical reasons and exclusive rights, and urgency, 
respectively. Further, reliance was placed on Case C-388/12, Comune di Ancona v Regione Marche 
[2013] ECR I-0000 on the basis of which it might be argued that the DfT was required to consult other 
interested operators before making a decision and provide a clear explanation for the direct award. See 
Cranston J’s judgment, paras.21 and 22. 
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recourse to arguments under EU law in this case) also risks a perception that 
preferential awards may easily be made under the pretext of an “emergency”. 
 The 1993 Act also equivocally states that the policy statement must identify 
the “means” by which selection will be made on the basis of a direct award. 76 
According to the policy statement, the SoS will consider all relevant factors including 
EU Treaty principles; a list of very broad factors is identified.77 However, it is unclear 
whether these means could be construed as award criteria. This risks both fettering 
the SoS’ discretion and exposure to judicial review but with limited prospect of 
success, given that these factors are stated at such a high level of abstraction. These 
have been criticized as lacking definition and in need of criteria to ensure that awards 
are made in a “structured and transparent way”.78 The DfT did not clarify such criteria 
in the final text. As will be discussed in Section 5, the policy statement suggests that  
these factors are also relevant to the determination of whether to appoint a public 
sector operator of last resort, even though the 1993 Act makes no reference to the 
basis on which an operator of last resort will be selected.  
Further, the DfT has recently stated that it has an “established and tested 
system of Direct Award”.79 However, it is only established and tested to the extent that 
there have been so many direct awards. There is little published detail on what this 
“established” process actually entails. The PSO Regulation and 1993 Act do not 
prescribe rules for the conduct of a direct award process. In 2013, the DfT published a 
high-level direct award process guide.80 However, it only provides a basic process 
diagram. It appears that the only publicly available information concerns a Ministerial 
Response to a Transport Committee question. This is no more detailed than a general 
statement to the effect that the DfT uses a comparator of the previous contract based 
on its out-turn costs and revenues which may be challenged to ensure value for 
money. 81  Any “challenge” appears to be purely internal amongst those decision-
makers within the DfT and the TOC responsible for delivery.82 
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 S.26(4B). 
77
 Para.14. These are divided into three: (a) business and service continuity; outcomes for passengers; 
value for money; affordability; delivery risk; and the continued quality of the franchise proposition; (b) 
broader market or programme considerations; the delivery of major projects and investment; franchise 
remapping; impacts on the wider UK rail network; and impacts that extend beyond or arise after the term 
of the franchise agreement in question; and (c) the wider government objective of enabling the continued 
provision of passenger rail services by private sector operators. 
78
 See TUC, Rail future, RMT and Northern Rail consultation responses to the draft revised 2013 policy 
Statement. 
79
 Department for Transport, Short-term Intercity East Coast train operator 2018 options report, May 
2018, Cm9617, p.11. 
80
 Department for Transport, Direct Awards High Level Process Guide, 3 December 2013.  
81
 Simon Burns letter to Louise Ellman as cited in HC Briefing CBP 6521, 9 January 2018. 
82
 The DfT has been similarly vague in its explanation of how it proposes to test the option of a direct 
award for the Inter City East Coast franchise (the other option being an operator of last resort). 
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 It was already clearly apparent, but an examination of practice in Great Britain 
confirms, that it is difficult to substantiate the EU’s assessment that the PSO 
Regulation direct award grounds are “precise, restrictive and objectively formulated”.83 
It has been suggested that the inclusion of broad circumstances does not represent a 
progressive step for the EU railway sector. 84  The UK pressed for limiting and 
subjecting direct awards to objective criteria when negotiating the amended PSO 
Regulation but has itself refrained from taking any domestic initiative. Ultimately, 
unless an EU-wide consensus is reached on the compatibility of competitive tendering 
with existing models of rail provision across Member states, attempts to limit direct 
awards through EU regulation are likely to achieve limited results. This does not 
necessarily preclude individual Member States from taking a lead in developing 
transparent and accountable direct award policies domestically. 
 
4. Procurement 
 
As identified in Section 2.2, the 1993 Act and PSO Regulation contain limited rules 
concerning the award of contracts. The DfT has published guides to franchise 
procurement which, following the Brown Review, were replaced by a Franchising 
Competition Guide in 2013 (not to be confused with the policy statement) setting out 
in more detail the general procurement process and demonstrating how assurance 
and approval is built into the system. However, these generally only provide a high-
level process overview. Ultimately, the DfT has reserved the right to conduct the 
procurement process according to the specific terms of each ITT. 
 
4.1. Publication 
 
The 1993 Act does not prescribe requirements for publication of contract opportunities 
and contract award decisions. Brown recommended that, in order to ensure earlier 
planning and engagement, the DfT should regularly seek to inform the market about 
upcoming competitions through the use of Prior Information Notices (PINs).85 The 
Government has responded to this recommendation. 86  Passenger Services now 
                                                 
83
 Brussels, 24.10.2016 COM(2016) 689 final 2013/0028 (COD) Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament pursuant to Article 294(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union concerning the position of the Council on the adoption of a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1370/2007 concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail, 
p.3. 
84
 Grith, “Legislative Comment on Regulation 1370/2007”, 89. 
85
 Brown Review, p.40, para.5.14. 
86
 Government Response to the Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme, p.17, paras.4.2-4.3. 
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publish inter alia an Annual Programme Prior Information Notice (PIN) and Rail 
Franchise Schedule and the ITT which is accompanied by a press notice. The direct 
award process guide also states that direct awards will comply with the requirement 
for a notice to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) at 
least one year before the direct award is entered into. 87  The UK also appears 
substantially to comply with publication requirements under the PSO Regulation, 
according to which authorities must ensure that prescribed information is published in 
the OJEU at least one year before the launch of the ITT procedure or direct award.88 
Operators may express their interest within a period fixed by the authority which must 
not be less than sixty days, following the publication of the information notice.89  
 Both the Franchise Competition Guide and direct award process guide also 
refer to the publication of a contract award notice issued through the OJEU.90 The 
amended PSO Regulation also provides that, for the new direct award grounds, 
authorities must publish concluded contracts and make public certain prescribed 
information within one year of award.91 According to the policy statement, the SoS 
must be able to comply with any applicable requirements regarding the publication of 
information in relation to direct awards.92 The DfT also publishes directly awarded 
franchise agreements.93  
 
4.2. Specifications 
 
Unlike the procurement Directives, the PSO Regulation and 1993 Act do not contain 
express provisions on specifications. Similarly, the Franchise Competition Guide 
refers to the “specification phase” but does not provide any detail aside from 
references to how it consults on specifications, which is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.3. A particular concern is what Brown has described as a difficult “trade off” 
between ensuring basic quality of public services and enabling TOCs to evolve and 
adapt services to ensure best value for money for taxpayers.94 Tighter specifications 
leave little room for innovation by bidders but are easier for the DfT to evaluate; looser 
                                                 
87
 In accordance with Articles 5(6) and 7(2) PSO Regulation. 
88
 Article 7(2) PSO Regulation and Article 5(3b) amended PSO Regulation  This does not apply to the 
emergency direct award ground in Article 5(5). 
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 Article 5(3b) amended PSO Regulation. 
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 Franchise Competition Guide, para.4.41. 
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 Articles 5(3a) and 4(4b) amended PSO Regulation. See also Article 7(3). 
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 para.11. 
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 See e.g. the Cross Country Direct Award Agreement dated 28 September 2016: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/614717/cross-country-
direct-award-franchise-agreement.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2018).  
94
 Brown Review, pp.15-16, para.2.11. See more generally, R Gladding, “Rail Regulation in the UK: The 
Role of Quality in the Passenger Rail Franchises” (2005) 14(4) Utilities Law Review 151. 
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specifications may invite innovation but requires greater expertise to evaluate.95 For 
inter-city franchises, flexible specifications have usually been considered more 
appropriate being closer to commercial enterprises (facing competition from airlines 
and motorways) but many cities and communities also view inter-city services as an 
important public service, requiring a measure of safeguarding in specifications. 96 
TOCs have criticised an increasing tendency to include specifications which are too 
prescriptive in terms of focusing on inputs rather than outputs,97 thereby increasing 
micromanagement and reducing flexibility.98 Brown recommended that: inputs should 
be specified only for very specific purposes;99 specifications should give flexibility for 
bidders to offer more resource efficient ways of delivering services;100 and the DfT 
should engage with industry to agree a framework for specifying train service 
requirements.101 Overall, there should be a greater focus on outcomes to give bidders 
more flexibility to bid more resource efficient timetables and to facilitate Government 
initiated changes.102 The Government has since stated that it is testing a wider use of 
outcome-based specifications.103  
However, it must be acknowledged that outcome-based specifications are not 
free from problems. For example, the Transport Committee has suggested that 
outcome-based specifications would reduce the burden on a prospective operator in 
the bidding process, presumably on the basis that it has fewer prescriptive 
specifications to meet.104 Yet, it is suggested that it can just as easily increase the 
burden on both TOCs that have to prove how they meet such requirements and the 
DfT which have the difficult task of demonstrating that they have evaluated bids 
objectively in light of less clearly defined specifications. Further, it is by no means 
clear that TOCs are, in fact, capable of offering innovation to the extent claimed.  
 Whilst striking the appropriate balance will be an ongoing process for the DfT, 
there remains a fundamental issue as to whether the procurement process is able to 
ensure that even the most basic train service requirements can be accurately set by 
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 Brown Review, p.38, para.5.7. 
96
 ibid., pp.15-16, para.2.11. 
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 For instance, first and last train times, and ticket office opening hours – rather than outcomes, such as 
the levels of passenger satisfaction actually achieved: Brown Review, p.16, para.2.12. 
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100
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 House of Commons Transport Committee, Rail franchising, Ninth Report of Session 2016–17, 30 
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the DfT and met by bidders. For instance, in the TSGN failure, the DfT specified a 
minimum number of required train services in the ITT but also encouraged bidders to 
suggest how they could provide additional trains. However, Network Rail expressed 
significant concerns about bidders’ proposals which did not comply with its planning 
rules. Starkly, the DfT considered that this would be addressed subsequently during 
Network Rail’s negotiation of operator’s access rights to the network and resolved 
through an amendment to the contract. 105  Of course, this runs contrary to a 
fundamental need for clarity on the specifications to be delivered before contracts are 
concluded. Contract amendments should be exceptional, not a substitute for effective 
contract planning.  
This also raises the question of whether or not there is currently effective 
consultation and alignment between key parties during the bidding process. For 
instance, the 1993 Act requires the SoS to first consult the ORR before preparing an 
ITT.106 There are no express provisions regarding consultation of other parties at any 
other stage prior to contract award and conclusion. It has been admitted that the 
alignment of incentives between Network Rail through the Periodic Review and 
operators through the franchise process is “sub-optimal”.107 Section 6.2.4 considers 
some of the potential ways in which consultation may improve the process for 
designing specifications. 
 
4.3. Consultations 
 
An important but often overlooked potential of the procurement process is to improve 
the role of public deliberation in the design of public services.108 For a host of possible 
reasons that are not explored in this article, the EU procurement Directives and PSO 
Regulation do not include designated provisions on stakeholder consultations. As 
indicated in Section 4.2, the 1993 Act provides that the SoS must first consult the 
ORR before issuing an ITT. During debate on the Railways Bill, it had been 
questioned why consultation was exclusively confined to the Regulator.109 As will be 
discussed in Section 6.2.4, who should be consulted in relation to what aspect of 
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 See generally, C. Gibb, Changes to improve the performance of the Southern network and train 
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franchise procurement remains a live issue. The DfT also conducts formal public 
consultations outlining proposals for a new franchise before issuing an ITT. A 
stakeholder briefing document is also published which includes analysis of public 
responses, explaining how the DfT has taken account of their views in developing the 
final specifications. In addition, bidders are also further consulted once the formal 
tendering procedure has commenced. Brown recommended that once the DfT had 
short-listed bidders, it should open its data site to make available the draft ITT which it 
has already developed to allow dialogue between bidders and the DfT on specific 
areas such as calibration of the risk-sharing mechanism, service specifications and 
quality measures to be applied in the evaluation and in the contract. 110 The DfT has 
since implemented this recommendation but for largely practical reasons, namely to 
reduce the number of questions raised by bidders clarifying the ITT.111 To this extent, 
the UK achieves a fair degree of stakeholder participation which enhances 
transparency and accountability.  
However, consultation response rates vary considerably for different 
franchises.112 Consultation documents comprising 60-70 pages have proven to be 
difficult to understand and there have been irregular consultations with transport 
groups for some franchises but not others.113 Further, there is uncertainty regarding 
how the consultation process should be properly conducted. For example, one issue 
at the heart of the TSGN failure has concerned the inclusion of Driver Only Operation. 
It has been acknowledged that this was not included in the public consultation on the 
franchise despite being included in the specification and which the DfT did not 
discuss.114  
In terms of legal issues, in 2016, Enfield Borough Council brought a judicial 
review concerning the DfT’s decision to exclude from the ITT for East Anglia franchise 
a service proposed during consultations.115 On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Enfield 
argued that, as a result of correspondence assuring it that the service would be 
included, it had a procedural legitimate expectation that, if a decision was taken not to 
include it, it could make further representations. The judicial review failed. Ultimately, 
the Court considered that general correspondence could not create a legitimate 
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expectation.116 However, it did identify “inept performance” by the DfT in assuring that 
the service would be included thereby undermining public confidence in its 
competence and the communications of its officials.”117 The Court also confirmed that 
the 1993 Act has conferred a broad discretion in a “complex, technical, quasi-
commercial field” to determine what ought to be provided by way of conditions in 
franchise agreements.118  
This challenge raises many issues. One is that it demonstrates just how 
difficult it is to try to hold the DfT to franchise specifications stated in DfT documents 
when the Court tends to treat them as “aspirational”.119 Another is that it is unclear 
who is lawfully permitted to participate in consultations. The Court identified but did 
not express a definitive view on whether it was fair and lawful for the DfT to have 
given the local authority a “reliable private insight” in advance of publishing the ITT 
and the briefing document.120 Similarly, in the failed NUM challenge referred to in 
Section 3.2, it was argued that there had been a failure to re-consult stakeholders 
before issuing an ITT where there had been a change of government policy during a 
franchise procurement process. The claim would have failed for lack of specificity and 
definiteness in DfT statements sufficient to give rise to a duty to consult on the back of 
a promise. On the one hand, a dismissal of such applications is understandable, as 
there is a legitimate concern of courts to respect discretion in the formulation of ITTs 
and they should not require a re-run of consultations which could delay a vital public 
service. On the other hand, the DfT’s apparent ineptitude, privileged pre-ITT 
consultations with select public bodies and policy changes impacting consultation 
expose grey areas in the process that may be susceptible to legal challenge. Section 
6.2.4 considers the extent of uncertainty among stakeholders as to the most effective 
regulatory responses for improving consultations. 
  
4.4. Qualitative selection 
 
Another aspect that has proven to be problematic concerns qualitative selection, i.e. 
the assessment of the bidder as opposed to the bid. However, the 1993 Act contains 
limited provision on qualification, e.g. in terms of grounds for excluding bidders for 
past poor performance, their economic and financial standing and technical capability. 
It simply provides that the SoS must not issue an ITT (or entertain a tender from) any 
                                                 
116
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person unless of the opinion that the person has, or is likely to have on 
commencement, an appropriate financial position, managerial competence, and is a 
suitable person.121 Similarly, the PSO Regulation does not contain such provisions. 
 
4.4.1. Pre-Qualification 
 
Whilst legal provision is limited, the DfT has, for a number of years, used “pre-
qualification questionnaires” (PQQ) to assess bidders' attributes for each competition. 
Brown observed that the PQQ process added unnecessary duplication and costs, as 
the exercise has to be repeated for every new franchise and focused excessively on 
assessing future competence. It was recommended that the PQQ should focus on 
proven competence based on past performance and the bidder’s financial strength 
and technical ability. 122 In response, in 2015, the DfT introduced the PQQ Passport. 
The Franchise Competition Guide links it expressly to the 1993 Act provision on 
suitability.123  TOCs must make an application for a Passport by completing a PQQ 
questionnaire following the procedure identified in a Passport Process Document.124 
The PQQ questionnaire is confined to assessing grounds for mandatory and 
discretionary rejection, capability and technical ability and health and safety; 
questions in respect of economic and financial standing are asked subsequently as 
part of the franchise expression of interest.125  Once the application is complete, the 
Passport is valid for four years enabling TOCs to express interest without repeating a 
managerial competency test each time they wish to bid. However, Passport holders 
will be required to answer additional PQQ questions tailored to the specific franchise.  
 The DfT considers that the PQQ Passport is similar to a qualification system 
under the Directives but does not commit to operating it in accordance with their 
qualification provisions.126 However, certain provisions directly import their wording, 
e.g. there is discretion to reject an applicant if found guilty of grave professional 
misconduct 127  or if there have been significant and persistent deficiencies in the 
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior contract which led to early 
termination, damages, or comparable sanctions; this includes inter alia: enforcement 
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action taken under s.55 of the 1993 Act. 128  If so, the Applicant has to provide 
information regarding the conduct, payment of compensation and whether measures 
have been taken to prevent recurrence. 129  If the authority considers that any 
information in a Passport Application is no longer correct, it may exclude that party 
from further participation in any franchise competition and consider cancellation or 
suspension of the Passport. 130  This domestic EU-inspired initiative has been a 
qualified success with PQQ passports awarded to TOCs in the UK and internationally.  
However, questions have recently arisen as to whether the PQQ process 
effectively dis-incentivises TOCs from overbidding and defaulting. In February 2018, it 
was announced that the current Virgin Trains East Coast (VTEC) franchise will be 
terminated.131 VTEC overbid in promising to deliver £2.3bn of premium payments 
based on higher revenue forecasts than what has materialised. This is estimated to 
have cost VTEC £186 million.132 VTEC is currently a PQQ passport holder. However, 
the SoS has been advised that there are “no adequate legal grounds” to restrict it 
from bidding on future franchises; the consortium was otherwise meeting its financial 
obligations with support from its parent company and operating services successfully. 
The SoS will simply keep its future eligibility under constant review.133  
Ultimately, it is difficult for the procurement process to effectively test bids 
based on projections of future revenues based on passenger growth such as to 
manage the risk of over-bidding and default. There are many endogenous and 
exogenous risks which vary from the general, e.g. economic downturn, through to the 
specific, e.g. increased uptake in use of other modes of transport such as road. 
However, the DfT has stated that it has refined the way it tests bids against a 
“downside scenario”.134 Despite this, the DfT maintains that this does not remove the 
possibility of future default and that, following Brown’s findings, it is not sensible to 
design franchise structures that seek to eliminate completely the risk of default.135 
Nevertheless, serious questions must be asked about whether the DfT has done 
enough to reduce, or is even complicit in, a conspiracy of optimism. Bring Back British 
Rail has argued that Brown was not suggesting that franchises should be allowed to 
fail subject to payment of compensation; rather, failure is only justifiable on the basis 
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that the DfT demonstrates its ability to deal with that failure. 136 The DfT continues to 
drip-feed information about how risk is assessed but only in response to inquiries; 
there is no publicly available documentation outlining DfT policy on the assessment of 
economic and financial risk in franchises. 
A broader policy issue relevant to procurement in all contexts, is if, and to what 
extent, qualitative selection should be used as an instrument for deterring the 
consequences of over-optimism, namely deficient or failed performance. 137 On the 
one hand, the DfT appears to consider that the £186 million loss incurred by VTEC 
alone sends a “strong message” to deter overbidding.138 On the other hand, there 
have been calls for more concrete action. Bring Back British Rail has argued that the 
SoS has acted unlawfully and/or irrationally in refusing to impose consequences, e.g. 
revoking or suspending PQQ passports and ensuring adequate investigations to limit 
VTEC’s ability to bid for future franchises.139 The case seems speculative, as the legal 
and policy framework is presently configured in such a way that the SoS exercises 
consideration discretion on this sensitive issue. The corresponding qualitative 
selection provisions of the Directives also provide that rejection on this kind of issue is 
discretionary, not mandatory. Further, the SoS is clearly presented with a dilemma. 
The decision to revoke or suspend is subject to a practical market constraint: there 
are already too few bidders in the market; exclusion may actually have the undesired 
effect of limiting future competition even further.  
Another issue concerns how to identify and investigate conduct meriting 
sanctions. It is unclear what constitutes a significant deficiency in performance of a 
substantive requirement, rendering a TOC unsuitable and entitling cancellation or 
revocation of passports. The same is the case in relation to the comparable ground 
for rejection under the Directives.140 It has also been argued that there is no evidence 
that the SoS suspended the Passports pending a full investigation and which should 
require the consortium to provide a justification, nor evidence that the SoS required 
them to re-submit relevant parts of their Passport application for wider consideration 
of their past performance in the last three years. Therefore, there are concerns about 
accountability and transparency in a number of respects. At the risk of presenting an 
unbalanced assessment in favour of the DfT, it should be added that there is also little 
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clarity for TOCs in terms of due process in the conduct of investigations and who may 
suffer reputationally. Section 6.2.4 revisits some of the potential issues facing 
qualitative selection in this context. 
 
4.4.2. Capital requirements 
 
Another major issue that has arisen concerns the design and assessment of capital 
requirements which bidders must meet to demonstrate financial capacity. These 
include requiring the TOC to provide parent company guarantees to cover the TOC’s 
losses during the franchise and performance bonds to cover the DfT’s cost of running 
services and re-letting a franchise. 
To illustrate, in 2012, the DfT awarded a franchise for the West Coast line to 
First Group. Virgin Rail, the incumbent, challenged the award and issued a judicial 
review. The main issue concerned the complex process for determining the level of a 
“subordinated loan facility (SLF)”, a type of parent company guarantee. Before it was 
heard, the DfT admitted fault and cancelled the competition. It has been observed that 
three matters could have, in principle, founded a challenge.141 First, there was a lack 
of transparency. Starkly, the DfT did not have a method for calculating the SLF. 
Bidders requested clarification on the method. In response, the DfT issued guidance 
as to how it would be calculated but not the full model because it contained 
assumptions about the TOCs’ behaviour which it did not wish to share.142 Bidders 
therefore remained unable to calculate the SLF.143 Secondly, there was inconsistency 
and inequality. A NAO investigation could not confirm whether answers to clarification 
questions were consistent and communicated to all bidders.144 Further, the DfT used 
data to derive one factor to risk-adjust bids but applied another.145 In addition, it was 
unclear whether the DfT’s approach to evaluation complied with that outlined in the 
tender documentation concerning agreement on revenue projections.146 Thirdly, there 
was an erroneous exercise of discretion resulting in unequal treatment.147  The tender 
stated that the DfT would “determine” the size of the SLF. Legal advisors cautioned 
that the subsequently issued guidance on calculating the SLF may have limited its 
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discretion in this regard but the Contract Award Committee went on to apply discretion 
notwithstanding.148   
 Following the InterCity West Coast failure, Brown concluded that large SLF 
facilities combined with significant bonding were unrealistic to expect of lenders and 
borrowers and should be unnecessary with appropriate risk allocation. Such 
requirements can restrict competition for franchising due to the sheer amount 
(examples include in excess of £200 million) and are more onerous than for foreign 
state-owned enterprises which have different risk capacity and cost of capital. 149 
Brown recommended: simplified liquidity requirements; an on-demand bond for each 
franchise; and a default indemnity supported by the franchisee’s parent company.150 
In response, the Government undertook a review of capitalisation in franchise bidding. 
Again, the DfT’s revised policy has not been published but it has indicated that it: no 
longer uses formal SLF requirements; requires that a portion of the total amount of 
capital will be backed by a bond provided by a financial institution of a certain 
minimum credit quality; and the whole amount must be supported by a parent 
company guarantee.151 Such requirements have been included in recent franchises, 
with requirements for up to fifty percent of the guarantee being bonded by a suitable 
provider.152  The Transport Committee has recently endorsed the parent company 
guarantee as crucial in protecting the public purse and which should not be removed 
or amended significantly. 153  The Government has further indicated that a new 
Forecast Revenue Mechanism will address the tendency of the transitional risk 
transfer mechanisms to generate “unsustainably large” parent company support 
requirements. 154  Again, the details of this mechanism have not been published. 
Section 6.2.4 discusses whether there is scope for imposing further regulatory 
controls in this area.  
 
4.5. Award criteria  
 
A final aspect concerns the award criteria against which a bid is assessed. The PSO 
Regulation and 1993 Act do not expressly refer to award criteria such as price or any 
concept of “Most Economically Advantageous Tender” (MEAT) comparable to that 
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provided in the Directives.155 The policy statement merely states that selection will be 
on the basis of an analysis of tenders in relation to criteria set out in the ITT and 
associated documents.156 The Franchising Competition Guide is slightly more detailed 
in stating that bids are ranked in descending order to identify the MEAT but does not 
identify any specific criteria comprising MEAT or general weighting of price to quality 
and other factors.157 This lack of detail is unsurprising. As Brown observed, there is no 
“one size fits all” evaluation framework. 158  For example, inter-city franchises and 
regional franchises may weight quality differently; it is generally weighted higher for 
regional franchises given intercity franchises already have greater incentive to deliver 
quality via passenger revenue earned.159 Nevertheless, in consultation on the draft 
2013 policy statement, the transport watchdog Passengerfocus “strongly believed” 
that even this “high level policy statement”, should make explicit reference to 
evaluation criteria and also confirm the SoS’s intention to ensure that assessment 
and/or award decisions place quality factors at the heart of the decision-making 
process. 160   
 Brown observed that, before 2013, price was the exclusive evaluation criterion 
in most franchise competitions; this was measured as the Net Present Value (NPV) of 
the premia or franchise support payments offered. In theory, quality would only be 
evaluated if the NPVs of bids were sufficiently close together. The winning NPV had 
always been far enough apart from the next placed bidder such that quality has never 
been a determining factor.161 The DfT was described as an “outlier in the range of 
both public sector and private sector procurement approaches” and that it was not, 
therefore, unsurprising that there had often been criticisms of franchisees’ subsequent 
service quality.162  Brown recommended retention of NPV but that there should also 
be an overt and direct weighting for quality and deliverability.163 A number of quality 
attributes were recommended for application on a franchise-by-franchise basis.164 An 
overall weighting of 20-40% for quality was envisaged.165 Brown also proposed a 
separate “financial assessment”. This would confirm the affordability and value for 
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money of the bid, that capital requirements have been met and that the financial 
strength of the parent had not deteriorated materially from the PQQ.166   
The Government responded to most of these recommendations. 167  The 
Transport Committee has found that there is undoubtedly an increased emphasis on 
passenger experience and service quality in recent specifications.168 Nevertheless, it 
is assumed across industry that cost remains the overarching and determinative 
factor. The Rail Delivery Group has observed that other factors are only assessed 
when the cost gap between the top two bidders is small and that, since the Brown 
review, all franchises have been awarded on the basis of cost. 169  Section 6.2.4 
considers recent reform proposals for increasing understanding of how evaluation is 
conducted by applying award criteria. 
  
5. Public sector operators 
 
This article has so far examined the role of the private sector in franchise 
procurement. However, the important role of the public sector should not be 
overlooked. Consistent with an ostensible policy of total privatization, Section 25 of 
the 1993 Act provides that a designated list of “public sector operators” cannot 
constitute franchisees. This may prevent any attempt at re-nationalisation “through the 
back door”. However, public sector operation is not completely excluded.  
First, this prohibition only applies to public sector operation in England and 
Wales. In Scotland, public sector operators can bid for a Scottish franchise.170 Further, 
the DfT has not precluded participation by TOCs from other Member States which are 
subject to state ownership or control. Only a limited number of rail services are 
operated by undertakings not involving foreign state control in Great Britain.  
Second, the PSO Regulation provides that an “internal operator” (i.e. a local 
authority providing rail services itself or by award of a contract to a legally distinct 
entity which it controls) may provide services but must not take part in competitive 
tenders organized outside its territory.171 This must be contrasted with the fact that 
there are no UK Government-backed public sector operators tendering for such 
contracts in other EU Member States; this exacerbates the historically limited success 
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of British private TOC access to European rail markets. 172   
Third, a public sector operator may be appointed as a last resort if a franchise 
is terminated. Section 30 of the 1993 Act contains a brief provision imposing a “duty of 
authority” which requires the SoS to provide services or secure their provision where 
a franchise agreement is terminated or ends but no further franchise agreement has 
been entered into. 173  The SoS is not required to do so where, in their opinion, 
adequate alternative services are available.174 According to the similarly sparse policy 
statement, the services of a public sector “operator of last resort” (OLR) may be 
secured but only if the SoS is unable to enter into or conclude negotiations with the 
incumbent private sector operator or any other private sector operator and only if it 
would not be appropriate in light of the factors otherwise permitting direct awards, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.175 In other words, there are at least two options before 
considering a public sector operator 
Notwithstanding, a public sector OLR has been used a number of times. For 
example, in 2009, in response to the failure of the National Express East Coast 
franchise, the Government set up Directly Operated Railways Ltd (DOR).176 DOR 
successfully ran services until 2015 at which point the DfT decided to discharge the 
S.30 duty “in-house”, wind-down DOR and pass services to Virgin.177  In order to 
discharge the S.30 duty, the DfT entered into a contract with Arup, SNC Lavalin and 
EY to provide advice, raising questions as to whether this function had been 
“privatised”. However, the DfT retains responsibility for this duty; in the event of a 
franchise failing, it will use one of its other OLR companies, DFT OLR Holdings Ltd 
(DOHL), along with a subsidiary.178 Further, it is recalled from Section 4.4.1 that, in 
2018, it was announced that the VTEC franchise will be terminated prematurely. The 
SoS has since published a report explaining the options available and the decision 
made between: (1) a new short-term contract with VTEC run on a not-for-profit basis 
with tightly defined performance requirements (and possible performance-related 
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payments at the end) or (2) transferring the operation to an OLR.179 The DfT has 
decided to transfer services to OLR on a short-term basis pending a new competition 
for a long-term East Coast Partnership. The DfT did appear to consider the merits of 
conducting a competition. It also considered making a direct award to a different 
private operator (which, in competition terms, is preferable to a direct award to an 
incumbent) but it was not possible both because of the timeframe and it was unlikely 
to deliver better value for money than the other two options.180 It is questionable 
whether the short-term award to VTEC on a not-for-profit basis would have ever been 
viable. Further, the appointment of an OLR over another private sector operator may 
have been politically expedient given the short time-frame, limited availability of a 
private sector TOC and may placate calls for complete renationalization.  
The VTEC termination highlights several issues concerning the S.30 duty.181 
Firstly, this report is not statutorily required.182 Thus, at the very least, it demonstrates 
a commitment to some degree of transparency, albeit ex post given that the option 
has already been chosen. It is, however, anomalous as the DfT does not similarly 
publish a report when considering whether to make a direct award, e.g. between an 
incumbent or new TOC. 
 Secondly, the rationale for, and and propriety of, using an OLR in this 
particular circumstance is open to criticism. The DfT has justified an OLR on the basis 
that it would present fewer barriers to close working collaboration between DfT and 
the operator pending the proposed East Coast public-private partnership competition 
and indeed, can even be instrumentalised to actively develop a “major new 
franchising approach” in a way that “is not typically the case”.183 As will be discussed 
in Section 6.2.2., this could be credited for using a public sector benchmark against 
which to test a competitive proposition; alternatively, it could be viewed as giving the 
TOC responsible for the failed franchise time to prepare a bid for a new PPP in which 
it is a contender.184 The DFT attempts to further justify the decision to appoint an OLR 
on the basis that, if the DfT were to make a direct award to VTEC, it may confer unfair 
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advantages on it in the bidding process for the PPP.185 Yet, the same can be said of 
any interim direct award made to a private sector TOC pending a new franchise 
competition. The DfT has not previously mentioned such risks and the need to 
safeguard against them pending a new franchise competition. It is not clear why it is 
considered sufficient justification for appointing an OLR. Neither S.30 nor the policy 
statement can be read to support the use of this jurisdiction in this way. 
 Thirdly, it is questionable whether the principles and criteria against which the 
direct award versus OLR assessment is made are sufficiently robust. The report 
states that the options are considered in accordance with the key principles set out in 
the policy statement;186 the SoS also highlighted that there were a number of other 
criteria relevant to the assessment of value for money.187 Yet, the report states that 
the assessment of options against these principles did not find strongly in favour of 
either option.188 Of course, it is possible for the principles and criteria to be sound but 
lead to an inconclusive result in their application. More likely, it suggests that they do 
not provide an effective means of discriminating between the options. For instance, 
the policy statement principles concern factors for determining whether or not to make 
a direct award; they are not factors tailored to determining whether or not to appoint 
an OLR. Further, the criteria highlighted by the SoS as relevant to the assessment of 
value for money are not, in fact, expressly stated in the policy statement. Moreover, a 
cursory reading of the report’s assessment suggests that it is difficult to discern 
whether its findings on the monetized versus non-monetised benefits are arbitrary. It 
should be observed that, in 2013, the campaign group Railfuture and the Association 
of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) called for clarity in the draft policy statement 
as to when, and how, a public sector operator will be selected when both competitive 
tendering and the direct award process have failed to ensure service continuity.189 
The DfT did not provide any in response at the time. There is no other detailed 
guidance regarding exercise of the S.30 duty. 190 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that what was really decisive was not these criteria but rather the fact that the OLR 
option provides “maximum flexibility” in order to implement the SoS long-term vision 
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for the future operation of East coast services through a PPP.191 
 Ultimately, the report describes the OLR as an “integral part of the franchising 
system”.192 Yet the appointment and exercise of the OLR function is subject to sparse 
provision in S.30 and policy. The future role of public sector operators is discussed in 
more detail in Section 6.2.2. 
 
6. Procurement Reform Post-Privatisation 
 
The preceding Sections have shown that the domestic legal and policy framework is 
generally compatible with EU law; this is largely attributable to the fact that it is easy 
to ensure compliance with EU law which excludes the procurement of rail services 
from the Directives and subjects them to a generic PSO Regulation. Further, there 
have been attempts to use procurement to improve accountability and transparency in 
the design and delivery of rail services. Nevertheless, this article has also identified 
areas of legal and commercial uncertainty with implications for the exercise of 
franchising procurement powers, the ability to bring effective legal challenges and the 
predictability of the franchising programme’s execution. Further, whilst the DfT has 
introduced reforms in response to inquiry recommendations, there are areas in which 
procurement could be enhanced through further reforms. Based on the findings of this 
article, this section explores just some areas that could be the subject of closer 
inspection.  
 
6.1. Post-privatisation Challenges  
 
Before introducing debate on reform, it is important to situate it within a wider 
discourse about the challenges facing the provision of rail services post-privatisation. 
As explained in Section 2.2, the 1993 Act is an overarching legal framework intended 
to facilitate the transition to a privatised model. It remains functional and adaptable to 
this day, as evidenced by amendment through, inter alia, the Transport Act 2005 and 
supplementation by revised franchising policies. However, a quarter of a century into 
the franchising experiment, it is suggested that the 1993 Act and associated policy is, 
perhaps, increasingly outmoded given the need to respond to a host of post-
privatisation changes and challenges which could scarcely have been anticipated at 
the point of privatisation. This article does not offer a serious attempt to explore these 
challenges but some may be proffered here. 
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 A first aspect concerns increasing supra- and inter- national influences on 
domestic transport services. Whilst rail services were largely excluded from the EU 
procurement Directives in 1993 (and which remains the case today), this article has 
identified various areas in which EU law has heavily influenced domestic regulation. 
Further, in light of Brexit, it has been suggested that: 
 
[t]here may be new options to look more closely at franchising and 
investment in the industry with an evolved form of procurement law no 
longer dependent on the EU models which are focussed, in part, on 
achieving fairness in circumstances where an incumbent national operator 
remains dominant in the member state […].193 
 
Further, globalisation of rail service provision is also evidenced by the extent of 
foreign TOC involvement in domestic franchise competitions which extend as far as 
China and Japan. This may require a reconsideration of whether domestic policy on 
the prohibition of public sector bidders should be revisited and which is discussed in 
more detail in Section 6.2.2 below.  
A second aspect concerns the changing nature of contracting techniques 
under the franchising model. At the point of privatisation, the proposition was relatively 
simple: the procurement of services provided from the private sector. However, since, 
the DfT has trialled “deep alliances”, the latest proposition being the East Coast PPP 
which will see Network Rail and TOCs operating under a single management team 
better coordinating track and train operation. The purported objective is to render the 
railways more “responsive”. 194 Yet, there is a real sense of uncertainty as to the DfT’s 
regulatory strategy: the DfT refers simultaneously to PPPs as a “new” model, a 
“reformed” model and an “evolution”. 195 Any procurement specialist will acknowledge 
that there are some similarities between procuring one-off or repeat services and 
long-term PPPs with operating risk transferred to the operator; however, there are 
also major differences which must be reflected in regulation at the domestic and 
supranational level. Yet, the DfT simply suggests that the new PPP contracting model 
will involve “a revised bid assessment process”, without any indication as to whether 
this requires a complete rethink of how procurement legislation and policy is designed 
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should this model be replicated as has been intimated.196 It should be recalled that rail 
services are currently excluded from the Concessions Directive and neither the 1993 
Act nor PSO Regulation regulate the defining characteristics of PPP contracts (e.g. 
risk transfer).  
A third aspect discussed in more detail in Section 6.2.3 below concerns 
increasing calls for devolution of rail services. As will be discussed, decentralised 
provision is difficult to reconcile with(in) a regulatory strategy historically predicated on 
centralisation. The 1993 Act does not provide a ready facilitator for this change in 
dynamic and rail devolution is not considered at all under the PSO Regulation with the 
exception of limited references to local authority provision. 
A final more general aspect concerns increasing public expectations for 
greater stakeholder engagement, accountability and transparency in all forms of 
public contracting, as evidenced by the many inquiries, reports and steadily increasing 
number of judicial review claims. These calls have largely grown in response to major 
failures in privatised provision. Again, it is questionable whether the 1993 Act and 
associated policy fully facilitates and protects these broader expectations. 
 
6.2. Reform 
 
The following illustrates just some of the potential areas of reform and is not intended 
to be exhaustive. 
 
6.2.1. Responsibility  
 
The UK has a troubled history of designating responsibility for franchising. 197 
Therefore, there is scope for debate on even the most fundamental question of who 
should be responsible. Whilst the SoS is now formally responsible, day-to-day 
functions have been designated to the DfT. However, the ICWC competition was 
heavily criticized for the fact that there was no direct ministerial oversight and the 
absence of a clear line of authority on key procurement decisions. The Brown Review 
therefore placed particular emphasis on clarifying roles and responsibilities. 198  In 
2014, the Passenger Services Directorate was created as the new process owner 
within the DfT. It consolidates the procurement and management of franchises into 
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one team headed by a Managing Director as the senior responsible owner.199 There is 
little published information about this new organizational structure. It remains to be 
seen to what extent it will materially strengthen internal lines of responsibility. 
On privatisation, there was disagreement between the DfT and Treasury as to 
whether the franchising and regulator functions should be combined. This was 
rejected on the basis that there was a risk that competition could be restricted in order 
to reduce franchising subsidies.200 Debate is now shifting away from concerns about 
who controls competition to accountability and transparency, in particular, whether the 
ORR could be given the role of evaluating bids, having shown its independence and 
in light of poor DfT competence.201 The ORR has firmly reiterated that franchising 
involves the conclusion of a private law commercial agreement between the DfT and 
TOCs for which the ORR has no responsibility.202  The Transport Committee has 
stopped short of such a recommendation but has suggested a transfer of franchise 
monitoring and enforcement powers to the ORR. Ultimately, it would be unusual for a 
regulator to award Departmental contracts in this way and it has not been considered 
whether this role could create a conflict of interest with regard to the ORR’s other 
statutory functions. As indicated, Passenger Services has now been established as a 
focal point for the franchising function. If firm responsibility is likely to remain with the 
DfT, perhaps debate should then turn instead to ways in which other actors can 
provide input, checks and balances within the procurement process and whether their 
roles and responsibilities could be more clearly defined in statute and policy. An 
example discussed in Section 6.2.4 below concerns involvement of the Network Rail 
Systems Operator. 
 
6.2.2. Public sector operators  
 
It is recalled from Section 5 that domestic public sector operators are prohibited from 
bidding for franchises. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully engage what is a 
complex, ideologically entrenched debate opposing two absolutist conceptions: 
“privatisation v nationalisation”. However, it is pertinent to observe the juxtaposition of 
the rationale for privatisation, which was to roll back the State and encourage free 
enterprise and the ability of foreign state-owned or controlled enterprises to bid. The 
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gradual “normalisation” or “creep” of public sector involvement in all its forms (e.g. use 
of OLR and PTE involvement in regional services) over time was not predicted during 
debate on the Railways Bill.  A fundamental question is whether it is possible to 
reconcile or accommodate public sector provision within an ostensible system of 
privatised rail.203  
Of course, one extreme measure would be to end private sector operation 
altogether. For instance, in 2017, the Labour Party proposed a Public Ownership of 
the Railways Bill to repeal the 1993 Act.204 However, it is submitted that this proposed 
strategy and others like it would be as blunt as the current prohibition. Whether rail 
remains privatised or is renationalised, it might be more pragmatic to allow public 
sector operators to compete against the private sector in order to provide a 
benchmark comparator against which to test the competitiveness of private sector 
provision, something that is absent under the current model of total privatisation. If 
this were to be considered impractical, it is recalled from Section 5 that the OLR 
jurisdiction is being (mis)used to appoint a public sector operator to test and build 
capacity for the pending East Coast PPP. 
If public sector operation were permitted more generally, the 1993 Act could 
be amended simply to remove the prohibition. However, it is likely that further 
provision would be required not least to ensure that the DfT could maintain a sufficient 
degree of impartiality during the evaluation of bids. Depending on who would act as 
the operator’s sponsor, this might also reopen debate on whether franchising 
responsibility should be transferred out of the DfT. Further, as indicated in Section 5, 
there is a case for reforming the legal and policy framework on the S.30 OLR duty. At 
the very least, there is a case for clarifying the legal status and operational role of the 
OLR. It is recalled from Section 5 that it has taken a Freedom of Information Act 
request to obtain basic details in this regard.  
    
6.2.3. Devolution 
 
Devolution is the first key aspect of procurement considered in the Brown Review. 
Brown identified a “seamless devolution” of parts of the railway to Scotland, Wales, 
the Borders and locally in recent years and recommended further devolution to 
English regions which the Government supported.205 Concerning nations, the 1993 
Act as amended enables Scottish Ministers to designate Scotland-only and certain 
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cross-border services. 206  Scottish Ministers can also publish a policy statement 
concerning ITTs. 207  There are currently two such franchises, ScotRail and the 
London-Scotland Caledonian Sleeper. Conversely, there has been more limited 
devolution in Wales. The Welsh National Assembly had sought amendment of the 
1993 Act to enable it to operate rail services but this was rejected. However, the 1993 
Act as amended does provide that the SoS must consult the National Assembly 
before issuing an ITT or entering into a franchise agreement where the services are, 
or include, Welsh services; further, the National Assembly must join the SoS as a 
party to the agreement.208 The Welsh Government was a co-signatory to the Wales 
and Border franchise which it has since taken over.209  
 Concerning English regions, local transport authorities cannot directly procure 
franchises. However, in London, the SoS must consult Transport for London (TfL) 
before issuing an ITT or when entering a franchise agreement for services to, from, or 
within, London.210 Similarly, the Railways Act 2005 introduced a requirement that the 
SoS must consult the relevant Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) before issuing 
an ITT or entering into a franchise concerning services in which it has an interest; the 
SoS can also approve a PTE becoming a party to the franchising agreement. 211  
Further, on an application by a PTE, the SoS may grant an exemption of services 
from being designated under a franchise known as a “de-designation order”.212 This 
enables a PTE to award an “operator agreement” to private operators to run select 
services. These exemptions have taken the form of statutory instruments by order.213 
The exemption of services is subject to certain statutory controls.214 The power to 
make a de-designation order is exercisable by statutory instrument subject to the 
negative resolution procedure.215 This is considered appropriate because these are 
freely negotiated commercial contracts; it also has the practical consequence of 
allowing the SoS to determine appropriate provision in any specific case.216 
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 In 2015, the Deregulation Act removed restrictions on the provision of 
passenger rail services by PTEs in England.217 It also amended the 1993 Act to 
broaden provision which the SoS may make in a de-designation order; this includes 
extending the enforcement and railway asset protection provisions applicable to 
franchise agreements to operator agreements. 218  Instinctively, the extension of 
provisions on franchising mutatis mutandis to exempt services seems contrary to the 
deregulation objective, given that it introduces more regulation. The purported 
rationale is to facilitate decentralization by enabling PTEs to take over regional 
services from central Government and reduce risks associated with full devolution by 
including certain safeguards. 219  It is also said to be consistent with the Brown 
Review.220 Influential thinktanks have called for some regional transport bodies to take 
over franchising activities. 221  Transport for the North (TfN) has argued that the 
preferred legal route would be a de-designation exemption order enabling TfN to let 
contracts in the same way as TfL and PTEs or to devolve the SoS’s franchising 
functions under the 1993 Act as in Scotland and increasingly in Wales.222 Regional 
bodies like TfN may prefer these routes not least because they achieve a degree of 
devolution without requiring significant legislative reform.  
It is debatable whether regional bodies could be bolder in arguing the case for 
entirely new and more comprehensive statutory powers. The choice of 
decentralization through de-designation of services can be criticized. The continuing 
treatment of regional rail service provision as an “exemption” to franchising denies the 
growing importance of regional governance in practice as well as new ways of 
thinking about how rail services can be more effectively regulated. Simply copying 
and pasting regulation applicable to inter-city franchises to regional services could be 
viewed as a blunt strategy that fails to take account of different aims, objectives and 
requirements of regional rail service provision. Further, it is recalled that such 
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exemptions are granted through secondary legislation to ensure that the SoS retains 
overall control, facilitating continuity rather than enabling change. 223  
Concerning procurement specifically, this also means that there is now 
asymmetry of legal and policy provision. The Deregulation Act extends franchise 
management and enforcement provisions to exempt services but is silent on the 
exercise of procurement powers. The DfT has been unclear on the issue of how 
procurement functions will be devolved. In 2012, the DfT published plans for rail 
decentralization. 224  The options proposed would have included devolution of 
procurement with varying degrees of control retained by the DfT but these were not 
subsequently developed.225 Brown did not refer to these plans but simply stated that it 
is likely that the DfT will jointly procure newly devolved franchises with the DfT using 
the existing devolved authority’s capabilities, e.g. in leading consultations pre-ITT.226 
Brown also recommended that the policy statement could include how the SoS would 
consider devolving responsibility as appropriate.227 However, the revised 2013 policy 
statement contains no such guidance. There are no equivalent regional procurement 
policy statements. On one hand, this means that regional transport bodies retain 
flexibility to develop their own policies suited to their needs. On the other hand, this 
may create variation across Great Britain. It is unclear what, if any, incentive there is 
for regions to coordinate regulatory approaches to procurement to promote best 
practices. Thus, ultimately, therefore, it is open to debate whether the existing unitary 
legal framework based on centralisation is sufficient to meet demands for an 
increasingly diverse and decentralised rail system.    
 
6.2.4. Procedural rules 
 
As indicated in Section 4, rail contracts have always been subject to few procedural 
rules under EU law. It is beyond the scope of this article to do so but it should be 
debated at the EU level whether rail contracts should continue to be excluded from 
the procurement Directives, being subject to very limited provision under the PSO 
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Regulation and, if not, whether the PSO Regulation is a suitable instrument for 
attaining the EU’s objectives towards long-term harmonisation.  
At the domestic level, this article has demonstrated that the 1993 Act and 
supporting policy is largely consistent with EU law. However, on balance, this 
combined legal framework is, perhaps, too rudimentary. On the one hand, it is 
possible to argue that complex contracts involving sensitive political and commercial 
judgment should necessitate fewer regulatory constraints. Indeed, this is one of many 
arguments historically made against regulating concessions under the procurement 
Directives. On the other hand, these are contracts of considerable public interest and 
whose procurement processes have proven to be susceptible, and subject, to legal 
challenge. It is worth emphasising Brown’s general observation that fewer and larger 
franchises today mean that competitions are now major procurement exercises with 
significantly increased complexity, risk and resource that can “make or break” 
bidders. 228  There are many arguments for and against more detailed regulation 
through legislation and policy but it is difficult to deny an instinctive sense that the 
underlying statutory framework is very “light touch”, all things considered.  
A further issue that has not been explored is whether the current policy 
framework provides effective support to the legal framework. The DfT relies 
extensively on “high-level” policy guidance that often lacks a clear purpose, is variable 
in content and is only revised ad hoc. Brown’s recommendations focused extensively 
on policy reform including of key policy documents. These documents are considered 
to be important for a host of reasons. At the very least, these require re-writing and 
updating to clarify fundamental aspects of the procurement process discussed in this 
article. However, a further question then arises as to how prescriptive policy should be 
and what reliance should be placed on it. For example, TOCs and passenger groups 
have complained about the DfT’s use of “legalistic” language in drafting the policy 
statement. Yet, both have simultaneously argued the need for it to set out in more 
“prescriptive” terms detailed criteria for making direct awards; in other words, to 
become more legalistic.229 If stakeholders disagree as to the intended nature and 
effect of policy, the DfT can hardly be criticised for producing generic guidance which 
offers little of substance.  
 Concerning the conduct of the procurement procedure, this article has 
identified several areas in which there is legal and practical uncertainty. Concerning 
specifications discussed in Section 4.2, it unlikely to be possible or desirable for 
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legislation to prescribe how specifications may be designed and the factors which 
should be taken into account, in particular, given that specifications can vary from 
trains per hour to less easily definable components of quality, e.g. passenger 
satisfaction. However, it is possible to improve participation in decision-making on 
specifications. It is recalled that, in some instances, it has not even been possible to 
specify basic service levels based on accurate forecasts of network capacity. 
Recently, the System Operator was established which is distinct from, but operating 
under the auspices of, Network Rail. One of its functions is to advise the franchising 
authority and bidders on the feasibility of different options for the use of future network 
capacity.230 This includes provision of a formal Network Rail input and positions to the 
proposed Expression of Interest, ITT and the bid evaluation.231 The objective is to 
develop specifications at a much earlier stage and provide clearer alignment with 
network rail capability and capacity. 232  It has been suggested that the System 
Operator’s views will have greater weight because it will be separately funded and 
more embedded in the regulatory infrastructure of the rail industry. 233  However, 
Network Rail has itself stated that it continues to receive only redacted versions of 
bids omitting many key commercial details and is not permitted to “sign-off” Train 
Service Requirements (TSRs).234 There is scope for debate on whether the 1993 Act 
and/or policy could formalise the System’s Operator role, e.g. regarding rights to 
access information and to approve TSRs, subject to oversight to ensure that this does 
not operate as a “veto”. At the very least, the involvement of actors other than the DfT 
in the procurement process is a first step to improving decision-making, provided that 
it does not lead to loss of the DfT’s overall decisional responsibility and accountability. 
 Concerning consultation discussed in Section 4.3, there is scope to revise 
consultation policy in light of recent judicial review challenges. In 2006, the Transport 
Committee recommended that a broad-based consultation with passengers should be 
a statutory requirement to be included in its next railways bill.235 Its precise content 
and consequences were unclear. However, recently, it has suggested the publication 
of a rail franchising “public engagement strategy” to address the same issue. The DfT 
has expressed its support which is unsurprisingly devoid of any enforceable 
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commitment. 236 This shift from proposed legal reform to vague policy reform could be 
due to improved consultation in recent years rendering the case for statutory reform 
unnecessary. However, again, it may reinforce the earlier point that stakeholders are 
unclear about which regulatory tools (law or policy or both?) should be used to 
achieve reform. Caution must be exercised against placing too much weight on failed 
judicial review applications; however, they do highlight that policy should be much 
clearer on who should be permitted to lawfully participate in consultations at different 
stages and how consultation proposals correspond to ITT requirements in order that 
expectations about service provision are clear. 
Concerning qualitative selection discussed in Section 4.4, it is recalled that the 
1993 Act contains only a single provision on “suitability”. It is worth emphasising that 
during debate on the Railways Bill in 1993, it was questioned what this provision 
actually meant.237 Yet, franchise failures have exposed many issues in this regard. 
There is scope for policy debate on the role which qualitative selection can play when 
dealing with issues of deficient performance. There is also scope for more joined up 
thinking about how procurement policy and management/enforcement are linked. For 
example, the fact that a franchisee has been the subject of enforcement action under 
the DfT’s enforcement policy is a means of identifying significant and deficient 
performance entitling discretionary rejection of a PQQ passport. The Transport 
Committee recently criticised the DfT for its handling of Southern Rail in failing to 
clearly identify and take remedial action in relation to contraventions of the franchise 
agreement. It recommended reform of the DfT’s 2008 enforcement policy which the 
Government has since rejected. 238 If the DfT is reluctant to take enforcement action, a 
means of identifying poor past performance during qualitative selection is necessarily 
limited.239 Fundamental uncertainty as to how to deal with deficient performance has 
been longstanding. For a number of years, it had been questioned whether it would 
be legally possible and politically desirable to terminate a defaulting franchisee’s other 
franchises (“cross-default”), as this possibility was not expressly excluded in franchise 
agreements.240 Regarding capital requirements, the NAO has observed that the DfT 
could learn from other areas of government where regulators ensure formal 
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processes of industry consultation and dialogue (as opposed to informal unpublicised 
consultations) in formulating appropriate financial guarantee requirements.241 The DfT 
could also publish clear policy statements on approaches to capitalisation and risk. 
 Concerning award criteria discussed in Section 4.5, it is recalled that, like 
specifications, it would be difficult to prescribe criteria and their weightings in 
legislation, given the specific circumstances of each individual franchise. The 
Transport Committee has instead focused its recommendations on improving 
transparency of the scoring of whatever criteria and weightings are applied. For 
instance, it has identified that the relative scoring is a “black box”; scoring is only seen 
internally by the DfT which limits transparency and acts as a “a barrier to trust” in the 
system.242 It has recommended that the DfT publish a scoring system (e.g. a weighted 
index) following a franchise competition, redacted to omit commercially sensitive 
details. This would give the public and industry a better understanding of the basis, in 
terms of quality and price, on which a franchise has been awarded.243 The DfT has 
since agreed with this recommendation in principle and would investigate ways in 
which final scores could be presented showing the differential from the winning bid on 
the proviso that commercial sensitivities could be protected. 244  This is just one 
example in which reform could focus on enhancing transparency instead of micro-
managing procedural aspects of the procurement process, although transparency 
inevitably has other trade-offs, e.g. the cost of publishing indexes and the need to 
protect commercial-in-confidence information. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This article has examined procurement as a key component of rail franchising. It has 
shown that domestic law and policy is generally compatible with a generic regime 
governing public service obligations under EU law. Further, there have been attempts 
to use the procurement process to improve transparency and accountability in the 
design and delivery of franchises. However, there remains legal uncertainty. The SoS 
has unclear franchising powers which risk fettering discretion and exposure to legal 
challenge. It is also difficult for stakeholders to challenge franchise procurement 
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effectively through judicial review. There is also practical uncertainty. There is a sense 
that the legal and policy framework does not present clear options for the SoS and 
DfT to act in the event of certain contingencies which are becoming more common. 
Further, TOCs and passengers expect predictability in the franchising programme and 
which may be compromised by lack of certainty at the procurement stage.  
This article has identified just some areas for potential reform not just in terms 
of how the procurement process is legally regulated but also in terms of thinking about 
how procurement is used as a vehicle for providing rail services. Both aspects are 
confronted by certain post-privatisation challenges. This article has not advocated 
specific reforms and it does not necessarily envisage a comprehensive regulatory 
code for procurement and management. There would be many arguments for and 
against a new “Rail Services Act”, for example. Rather, this article has focused on 
procurement in order to generate a more rigorous legal debate on rail generally. The 
train has already left the station: it is time for legal discourse to catch up. 
